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Best available copyMONETARY  POLICY  AND  REAL  INTEREST  RATES: 
NEW  EVIDENCE  FROM  THE  MONEY  STOCK  ANNOUNCEMENTS 
This paper  presents new  evidence on  how  asset prices respond  to new 
information  about  the money  stock.  It shows  that the information  content of 
money  stock  announcements  and  the response  of  asset prices to  new  information 
in  the announcements  vary with changes  in  the monetary  policy regime,  the 
Federal  Reserve  operati  ng  procedures,  and  the reserve accounti  ng  rules.  Whi 1  e 
previous  studies have  examined  how  asset prices respond  to the money  stock 
announcements  under  the interest-rate targeting procedure  and  the nonborrowed 
reserve procedure,  we  have i  ncl  uded  new  evidence from the borrowed reserve 
targeting procedure under  both 1  agged  and contemporaneous  reserve accounting 
rules.  Looking at  how  both forward exchange  rates and  other asset prices 
respond  to the announcements,  we  distinguish between  periods when  the 
asset-price response reflected a change  in  the real interest rate and  those 
when it  reflected a change  in  the inflation premium.  Finally,  we  show  that 
the new  contemporaneous  reserve  accounting rules have  greatly reduced  the 
information content of the money  stock announcements. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyI.  Introduction 
The  explicit examination of expectations has  been  a recent important 
development  in  economic  theory and  policy.  Studies have  emphasized  the 
importance of the market's perception of and  reaction to new  information about 
economic  policy.  In  particular,  in  the area  of  monetary economics,  one  of the 
ongoing debates  has  been  over whether monetary  policy can affect long-term 
real interest rates.  The  resolution of this debate  depends,  to a large 
extent,  on  how  markets respond to perceived changes  in  monetary  pol  icy.  While 
there have  been many  theoretical  and  empirical  studies of this issue,  the most 
recent examination can be  found in  several  papers  that investigate the 
response  of asset prices to weekly money  stock announcements. 1 
The  announcement  studies are based on  the efficient market hypothesis, 
which states that the current asset price will reflect all publicly available 
information.  Changes  in  prices should  ref1  ect only new  information.  The 
empirical model  used  in  studies of money  stock announcements  takes  the 
following form: 
where 
hAit  =  change  in  the ith  asset price from before the 
announcement  to after the announcement, 
UMt  =  surprise in  the money  stock  announcement  at  time t, 
EMt  =  expected change  in  the money  stock at  time t,  and 
e =  random  error. 
If  the efficient market hypothesis  is  true,  if  we  have  accurate measures  of 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyexpectations,  and if  the money  stock  is  an  important factor in  determining the 
price of the asset,  then al  will be  significant and  ap  will be  zero. 
A  result common  to all of  these announcement  studies is  that estimates of 
al  are positive when  interest rates are used as  the dependent  variable in 
equation 1.  Several  hypotheses  have  been  presented to  explain this positive 
correlation between money  stock  surprises and changes  in  interest rates. 
These  hypotheses  can be  classified into two  broad categories.  The  first 
attributes the positive value of al  to  an  inflation premium  that changes 
because  the money  stock  surprise is  treated as a money  supply shock.  The 
second attributes the positive value of al  to  a policy anticipation effect. 
The  money  stock surprise is  treated as  a money  demand  shock  that is  expected 
to be  offset by  future policy actions. 
In  this paper we  provide new  evidence to explain how  asset prices have 
responded  to surprises in  the money  stock  announcement  over the past seven 
years.  Our  sample  period,  September  1977  to September 1984,  was  determined by 
the availability of survey data on  the expected change  in  the money  stock. 
The  period includes important changes  in  monetary policy and  operating 
procedures.  We  distinguish between policy regime changes  and operating 
procedure changes,  which are not necessarily the same.  The  two may  be  the 
same  if  the central bank  is  overly concerned about short-run money  market 
conditions or if  the short-run operating procedure is  not constrained by  some 
long-run objectives.'  We  define a policy regime change  as  a change  in  the 
objective function of the pol  icy authority.  If  the objective function is  a 
weighted average  of different goals,  then the policy change  may  be  a shift in 
the re1  ative weights  for the different goals.  Changes  in  operating procedures 
may  lead to  changes  in  the response of short-term asset prices to  the money 
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change  in the objective function.  In  this case,  there is not likely to be  a 
response  by  1  ong-term  asset prices. 
In  October 1979  there was  an  apparent change  in both  the monetary  policy 
regime  and  the short-run operating procedure.  The  Federal  Reserve  switched 
from  a  pol icy that had  led to accelerating inflation to a  policy  that led to 
decelerating  i nfl ation.  The  Federal  Reserve  a1 so switched  from  the federal 
funds  operating procedure  before  October 1979  to the nonborrowed  reserve 
operating procedure  after October 1979.  There  was  a1 so another change  in 
operating procedures  in October 1982:  the Federal  Reserve  switched  from 
nonborrowed  reserve targeting to borrowed  reserve targeting,  which,  as we  show 
below,  is an  interest-rate smoothing  procedure.  In  this paper  we  show  that 
the pattern of  asset price reactions to money  stock  innovations  in the 
post-October 1982  period  has  not returned to the pattern that prevailed  in the 
pre-October 1979  period.  Evidently,  market  participants  be1 ieve the Federal 
Reserve  has maintained a disinflationary pol icy despite its returning to an 
interest-rate smoothing  procedure. 
There was  also an  institutional change  that should  have  an  effect on  how 
asset prices respond  to the money  stock  announcements.  On  February  2,  1984, 
the Federal  Reserve  switched  reserve accounting  rules; the lagged  reserve 
accounting  rul es  (LRR)  that prevai 1  ed  before February  2,  1984,  were  rep1 aced 
by  a1 most  contemporaneous  reserve accounting  rules  (CRR) .  We  expl ai  n  how  the 
change  in rules has  greatly reduced  the  information content of  the money  stock 
announcements. 
In  the literature review  we  show  that existing hypotheses  are inadequate 
to explain the  pattern of  results that has  emerged  from  past empirical 
studies.  In  this paper  we  add  a  new  market,  the forward  exchange  rate, and  a 
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new  evidence lends  support to the following conc1usions: 
First,  the strength of the reaction of the federal  funds rate and  other 
short-term interest rates to the money  stock announcements  depends  on  the 
prevailing operating procedure  and  the reserve accounting rules. 
Second,  in  the pre-October 1979  period of an  inflationary pol  icy,  money 
stock  surprises contained information about future inflation rates.  Interest 
rates and  exchange  rates reacted to the money  stock  surprises,  because  private 
agents revised their inflationary expectations upward.  Under  1  agged  reserve 
requi  rements,  surprises in  b11  reflected money  demand  shocks.  The  Federal 
Reserve  automatically accommodated  these shocks  in  the short run.  Over  the 
long run,  policy allowed an  upward  drift  of the monetary  targets.  This 
behavior led the market to believe that money  stock  innovations would 
eventually lead to an  upward  revision of  money  targets and,  consequently, 
higher inflation. 
Third,  in  the post-October 1979 period,  the Federal  Reserve's monetary 
policy changed  to one  of disinflation.  The  rapid deceleration of inflation 
early in  this period has  been  followed by  1  ow  and relatively unchanged 
inflation rates in  the last two years.  In this period,  the reaction of 
nominal  interest rates and  the dollar exchange  rates to  money  stock  surprises 
reflected changes  in  the market's assessment  of current and  future  real 
interest rates.  This assessment  resulted from the perception that the 
monetary  authorities would not fully accommodate  the unusual  and  persistent 
money  demand  shocks  that occurred during this period.  These  money  demand 
shocks  originated in  portfolio disturbances associated with the rapid decrease 
in  inflation,  financial  innovations,  and  deregulation. 
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of the information content of  money  stock  announcements  and  a critical review 
of major hypotheses,  including recent findings from the foreign exchange 
market.  Section  I11 sets out our hypotheses  explaining how  asset pt-ices  react 
to  money  stock announcements  under  alternative policy regimes and  operating 
procedures.  Section  IV i  ncl  udes  empirical  evidence about  the response  of 
short-term interest rates,  long-term interest rates,  forward interest rates, 
spot exchange  rates,  and  forward exchange  rates to  money  stock surprises in 
four separate  sub-periods between September  1977  and September  1984.  This 
section a1  so i  ncl  udes  concluding comments. 
11.  The  Issues Surrounding the Effects 
of Money  Stock  Announcements 
The  Information Content  of Weekly  Announcements 
A  common  error in  the literature on  the effect of  money  stock announce- 
ments  is  the reference to them  as  a supply effect.  Nichols,  Small,  and 
Webster  (1  983)  correctly point out that the weekly Federal  Reserve  release of 
the M1  data is  an  announcement  of the preliminary estimate of the change  in 
the money  stock  for the week  ended  eight days  to ten days  earlier.  The 
announcement  of the change  in  the money  stock provides new  information about 
the quantity of money.  It does  not distinguish between  demand  and  supply 
shocks,  nor does it  distinguish between  temporary  and  permanent  shocks. 
If the weekly  M1  growth series has  a deterministic trend,  then weekly 
variations in  MI should be  the result of temporary  shocks  and  the weekly 
announcements  should provide 1 i  ttle information about  future 1  eve1  s of money 
and  prices.  If so,  the observed response of asset prices to  money  stock 
announcements  may  resul t from market over-reacti  on.  Thi  s hypothesi s i  s 
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series has  a stochastic trend,  then weekly  variations in  M1  could be  the 
result of permanent  shocks,  and  the weekly announcements  could contain useful 
information about future levels of money  and  prices.  In this case,  the market 
reaction is  appropriate. 
We  use Nelson  and Plosser's (1982) method  to test whether  a series has  a 
deterministic or a stochastic trend.  Two  models  of the weekly money  stock 
series are shown  below.  The  first  is  a model  with a deterministic trend: 
The  second  is  a model  with a stochastic  trend: 
In each  case,  and 0 satisfy conditions for stationari  ty and  inverti  bil  ity.  7' 
In  model  2 the surprise in  the money  stock announcement  will be  a transitory 
random error,  likely to be  offset in  future deviations of money  from trend. 
In  model  3 a surprise in  MI is  permanently  incorporated in  the 1  eve1  of MI. 
The  Federal  Reserve's  policy of rebasing targets at  the end  of each  targeting 
period 1  ends  credence  to the second model . 
If  model  2  is  accurate,  then weekly  variations in  MI should have  little 
information about  future levels of money  and  prices.  Federal  Reserve 
officials have maintained for some  time that such  is  the case.  In a letter to 
Senators Jake Garn  and William Proxmire,  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Paul  Volcker 
(1  981 )  wrote: 
There  is  nearly unanimous  agreement  by all observers  that weekly 
money  statistics are extremely erratic,  and  therefore,  poor 
indicators of underlying trends.  Whi 1  e monthly data can often 
deviate considerably from such  trends,  the weekly  observations are 
particularly "noisy."  Week-to-week  changes  are quite large and 
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the random  nature of  money  flows  and  difficulties in seasonal 
adjustment--accounts for plus or minus $3.3 billion  in weekly  change 
two-thirds of  the time.  Such  a large erratic element appears 
intrinsic to money  behavior,  rather than  implying  poor  underlying 
statistics. 
This  interpretation of  the "noise"  in MI  data  suggests  that weekly  MI 
announcements contain  1  i ttl  e  information  about future 1  eve1 s  of  the money 
stock  or prices.  This interpretation implies that there is a deterministic 
trend in the money  supply.  If  so,  the variance of  forecast errors at period 
t+n is  bounded  for all n. 
If model  3 is accurate,  the variance of  the forecast error is unbounded  as 
n3-,  and  the latest change  in itll  may  be  an  important  bit of  information  in 
forming  predictions about long-run  level s of  MI.  The  market  will  use  a1 1 of 
the information  it has  to make  1  ong-term  forecasts of  MI.  When  the long-run 
objectives of  policy are unclear,  the weekly  statistics become  more 
important.  The  Federal  Reserve  can  make  the weekly  statistics less relevant 
by  announcing and  foll  owing  credible long-run  pol icies. 
The  test is  calculated from  the following regression: 
where 
m  =  natural  log of  MI, 
A =  constant, 
t =  time,  and 
e =  random  error. 
Here  k  is large enough  to remove  tile  systematic  component  from  the error 
term.  The  test is based  on  the assumption  that only autoregressive  terms  are 
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Plosser  (1  982)  show  that the test of  whether a  time  series has  a deterministic 
or a stochastic trend can  be  reduced  to a test of  whether  the autoregressive 
process  generating the time  series has  a  root equal  to unity.  They  show 
that f1  of  equation  4  is equal  to the sum  of  the autoregressive parameters, 
the  (Pi.  Under  the null  hypothesis  that the time  series has  a stochastic 
trend,  this sum will  equal  unity.  The  results of  this estimation,  shown  in 
tab1  e 1 , support  the hypothesis  that the weekly  M1  data are generated  by  model 
3.  The  relevant statistic for our  purposes  is 7,  which  is the t-statistic 
for the hypothesis  that  P1 =  1.  Fuller (1976) shows  the distribution of  Z 
under  the  hypothesis  that  f1  =  1.  For  the sample  size of  100,  the 0.05 
critical  value  is -3.45;  for a  sample  size of  250,  the 0.05  critical  value  is 
-3.43.  Dickey  and  Fuller (1  979)  provide Monte  Carlo evidence on  the power  of 
the  test. 
Using  both  the expected  and  the first-published data on  MI,  we  cannot 
reject the hypothesi s  that the autoregressive processes generating  the data 
contain  a  root equal  to unity.  These  results are consistent with  the 
hypothesis  that the weekly  money  stock  data contain important information 
about  future levels of  MI.  Of  course,  whether  the announcements contain 
information  about future prices depends  on  whether  the stochastic trend is 
caused  by  non-stationarity in the nominal  money  supply  or  in the real  money 
demand  function.  An  examination  of  this issue is provided  in the discussion 
be1 ow. 
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Process Generating  Weekly  Money  Stock  Data 
Pre-October 1979  Post-October 1979 
Jan  5,  1978 - Oct  4,1979  Feb  8,  1980 - Sept  20,  1984 
mt  log (Mia)  log (Mle)  log (Mla)  log (Mle) 
SEE  0.00554  0.00377  0.0051 8  0.00425 
Notes:  The  t-statistics are shown  in  parentheses.  Mla is  the first 
pub1  ished figure for MI.  Mle is  the sum  of the previous period Mla and 
the change  predicted by  the participants in  Money  Market Services weekly 
survey.  The  second  sample  period begins in  February 1980,  after the change  in 
the definition of MI.  In no  case  can  we  reject the hypothesis  that 
f 1 =  1.  The  0.05  critical value  for % is  -3.43  for sample  sizes of 100. 
Critical Review  of the Literature 
Extensive research on  the topic of the money  supply announcements  over the 
last five  years has  led to a predominance  of four main  hypotheses.  The  first 
hypothesis asserts that a surprise in  the money  stock announcement  contains 
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expected inflation hypothesis,  in  which a positive money  stock  surprise will 
be  incorporated in  future levels of the money  supply.  As  a result,  interest 
rates rise to reflect an  inflation premium,  and  the dollar depreciates against 
major  foreign currencies.  However,  the spot exchange  rate does  not depreciate 
in  the pre-October 1979  period as  this hypothesis predicts.  Furthermore,  the 
spot value of the dollar appreciates  following the money  stock announcement  in 
the post-October 1979  period.  Also,  this hypothesis does  not explain why 
long-term interest rates and  forward interest rates react more  strongly in  the 
post-October 1979  period than in  the pre-October 1979  period.  To  explain the 
stronger reaction of long-term rates in  the later period,  advocates of the 
expected inflation hypothesis  have  to assume  that the October  6,  1979,  change 
in  the operating procedure  1  ed tc a decl i  ne  in  the Federal  Reserve ' s concern 
about  inflation. 
The  secbnd  hypothesis assumes  that money  stock surprises contain 
information about money  demand  shocks.  This is  called the policy anticipation 
hypothesis.  Works  by  Urich and Wachtel  (1981 ),  Urich (1982),  and Roley  and 
Walsh  (1983)  are based  on  the assumptions  that prices are fixed and  that the 
Federal  Reserve uses  a partial adjustment procedure  to achieve its  monetary 
targets.  The  public expects  deviations of the money  stock  from the 
preannounced  targets to be  offset gradually.  Under  nonborrowed  reserve 
targeting,  an  exogenous  demand  shock  will automatically  force more  banks  to go 
to the discount window.  This shock  will be  completely offset if  the Federal 
Reserve maintains its  nonborrowed  reserve  target.  Under  targeting of the 
federal  funds rate,  the  shocks  initially  will be  accommodated  but could be 
offset eventually if  the Federal  Reserve  were  willing to adjust the federal 
funds  rate target promptly.  Therefore,  given price rigidity,  a positive money 
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growth,  which  would  raise short-term real  interest rates via  the liquidity 
effect and  long-term  real  interest rates via  the expectations  theory of  the 
term  structure.  The  change  in real  interest rates would  induce  international 
capital  flows  that would  result in a do1 lar appreciation.3  The  duration and 
strength of  the policy  anticipation effect would  depend  on  how  long it  takes 
the Federal  Reserve  to offset past deviations from  the target and  the degree 
of  price rigidity. 
This  hypothesis  is not consistent with the empirical  evidence.  The 
inconsistency  lies in the reaction of  the forward  interest rates.  Shiller, 
Campbell , and  Schoenhol tz (1  983) and  Hardouvel is (1  984)  have  shown  that 
longer-term forward  interest rates react strongly  to money  stock 
announcements.  The  pol icy anticipation hypothesis expl ains the result only  if 
the liquidity effect lasts for several  years. 
The  third hypothesis is a  synthesis of  the first two.  Hardouvel is (1  984) 
and  Loeys  (1984) argue  thax the liquidity effect dominates  in the short run 
and  the inflation premium  effect dominates  in the long  run.  Following  a 
positive surprise in the money  stock,  short-term  nominal  interest rates rise 
because  the market  expects  the Federal  Reserve  to offset partially the 
deviations above  the money  supply  target.  However,  because  the Federal 
Reserve  is not expected  to offset the money  stock  surprise completely, 
inflationary expectations and  long-term  interest rates rise.  In  addition, 
Hardouvelis shows  that the reactions of  the spot exchange  rates and  the 
expected  spot exchange  rates five years ahead,  which  are derived  from  an  open 
interest rate parity condition,  support his hypothesis.  The  spot values  of 
the dollar against several  foreign  currencies appreciate,  and  the expected 
future spot rates depreciate.  However,  the expected  future spot rates are 
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These  results cannot  be  used  to distinguish between  the policy  anticipation 
and  the  inflation premi urn  hypotheses,  because  the inflation premium  hypothesis 
was  implicitly assumed  in the construction  of  the expected  spot exchange  rate. 
There  is another drawback  in this third hypothesis.  Cornell  (1  983b,  p. 
655)  points out that "it is intuitively difficult to understand  how  the same 
announcement  leads agents to expect monetary  restriction in the short run,  but 
monetary  ease  in the long  run."  The  Hardouvelis  argument  that the significant 
response of  long  forward  rates  in the post-October 1979  period  reflects an 
inflation premium  is not satisfactory.  The  period  before October 1979 was 
more  inflationary, yet empirical  evidence  indicates a weak  reaction  of  forward 
interest rates to money  stock announcements during  the  period.  The 
Hardouvel is hypothesi s  is not consistent with this evidence.  Furthermore, 
there is no  economic  theory to explain why  the spot and  expected  spot exchange 
rates would  move  in  opposite directions following  a surprise in the money 
stock  announcement.  The  explanation  given  by  Hardouvelis  is plausible. 
However,  this explanation  is based  on  an  arbitrary expectation of  a future 
reversal  of  pol icy,  which  is not  refutable. 
The  fourth  hypothesis,  outlined by  Nichols,  Small,  and  Webster,  is  called 
the  real  activity hypothesis.4  They  argue  that if prices are fixed and  the 
Federal  Reserve  pursues  a policy  of  constant money  growth,  money  stock 
surprises provide  information  about current and  future real  money  demand 
growth  that results from  real-sector disturbances.  A  positive money  stock 
surprise signals to the market  participants stronger current and  future money 
demand  growth  relative to the given  money  supply  growth.  As  a  result, current 
and  expected  future real  interest rates rise to clear the money  market. 
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strong in  1  ate 1981 ,  1982,  and early 1983  whi 1  e real activity was  surprisingly 
weak;  yet,  this was  the period when  the relationship between money  stock 
surprises and  interest rates was  strongest.  Furthermore,  this hypothesis 
cannot explain why  interest rates respond to  money  stock  surprises in  the 
pre-October 1979  period when  the Federal  Reserve  was  accommodating money 
demand  shocks.  On  the analytical  level,  the assumption of price rigidity is 
not necessary  to  explain why  the surprise in  the money  stock  announcement 
leads to changes  in  expected real interest rates. 
Evidence  from the Foreign Exchange  Market 
Since  the evidence of the reaction of interest rates to the money  stock 
announcements  was  insufficient to distinguish between  competing hypotheses, 
researchers were  encouraged  to 1  ook  at  a cross section of markets.  Engel  and 
Frankel  (1984)  use  evidence  from the spot market for exchange  rates to 
distinguish between  the expected inflation hypothesis  and  the pol  icy 
anticipation hypothesis.  This subsection  shows  that the assumption  of price 
rigidity introduced by  Engel  and  Frankel  is  not necessary  to explain the 
appreciation of the dollar following a positive money  stock  surprise.  Also, 
the information provided by  the spot exchange  rate is  incomplete and,  under 
certain conditions,  may  be  mi  sl  eadi  ng. 
A  ful  ly devel  oped  version of the Engel -Frankel  model i  ncl  udes : 
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mt  and  pt  =  logs of the money  supply and  the price level, 
it  =  short-term interest rate, 
at  =  influence of real income  and  other exogenous  shifts in  money  demand, 
rt =  real interest rate, 
=  expected variable,  and 
*  =  foreign country  variable. 
Equation  5  is  a Cagan-type money  demand  equation.  Equations 6  and  7  show  the 
Fisher relationships for the home  country and  the foreign country.  Expected 
e  e* 
inflation is  represented by  pt+l  - pt.  Normalizing so  that pt+l 
-  *  * 
- pt  =  0,  and  assuming  that rt = rt, we  obtain the following 
expression  from equations 5  through 7: 
e  * 
(8)  mt  - pt  =  - A(P~+~  -  pt  +  it) + at. 
Solving 5  for pt  through the method  of  recursive substitution,  we  obtain the 
foll  owing expression: 
Assume  that a positive money  stock  announcement  in  period t leads  the market 
to revise upward  its  expectations concerning current and  future money  demand 
changes.  If the Federal  Reserve  is  following a credible pol  icy of price 
stabi  1 i  ty  , the announcement  wi  11 not affect the market' s expectations with 
I 
regard to future money  supply changes.  The  new  price level  (pt)  will be 
equal  to: 
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I 
Because  Etat+j  is greater than  Etat+j  for every  value  of  t, the 
t -  pt  difference is negative;  i.e.,  the  price level  will  fall.  Note 
that if the exchange  rate is determined  by  purchasing  power  parity, the 
exchange  rate equation can  be  written  in log form  as follows: 
The  reduction  in the domestic  price level  will  lead  to a dollar appreciation, 
* 
given  that pt  remains  unchanged.  Similarly,  it  can  be  shown  that the 
future price level,  pt+l,  will  fa1  1.  If  the forward  exchange  rate is  an 
unbiased  predictor of  the future spot rate, and  if the latter is determined  by 
the price level  differential  in  period  t+l, the forward  exchange  rate will 
appreciate. 
Wal  sh  (1984) argues  that the change  in operating procedures in 1979 caused 
a change  in the  parameters  of  the money  demand  function.  Whether  due  to the 
inflation policy change  or the operating procedure change,  there appears  to 
have  been  an  increase  in the interest elasticity of  money  demand  sometime 
after October 1979.  If there was  an  increase in 2,  the change  in  the 
price level  shown  in equation 11  would  be  larger following  a surprise increase 
In  sum,  it  has  been  shown  that if a money  stock  surprise signals a 
persistent money  demand  shock  originating  in a portfolio disturbance and  if 
the Federal  Reserve  is following  a fixed money  growth  rule, the spot and 
forward  exchange  rates will  appreciate.  There  is no  need  to assume  price 
rigidity to obtain this result. 
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money  stock  announcements  ignore the effects of foreign exchange  intervention 
by monetary  authorities the day  after the money  stock announcement.  To 
illustrate this point,  assume  that the monetary  authorities intervene based on 
the fol  1  owing rul  es : 
where 
It  =  amount  of dollar intervention by  the United States  the day 
after  the announcement, 
S  Mt  =  money  stock surprise,  and 
=  amount  of dollar intervention by  West  Germany  the day 
after the announcement. 
Although the exchange  rate and  intervention are interdependent,  for the sake 
of simp1  icity we  can write the following equation: 
where 
e  =  exchange  rate on  the day  following the announcement,  and  t 
Zt  =  other relevant variables on  the day  following the 
announcement. 
Equation 15  states that on  the day  following the announcement  the exchange 
rate will be  determined by  domestic  and  foreign intervention and  all other 
re1  evant factors represented by  the vector Z. 
The  observed relationship between  a positive money  stock  surprise and an 
appreciating dollar may  be  spurious.  If the Federal  Reserve  expects the 
dollar to depreciate sharply  following a positive money  stock  surprise,  it  may 
purchase dollars heavily the next day--perhaps  jointly with the West  German 
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announcement  effect but by  intervention;  the  Engel  and  Frankel and  the 
Hardouvel is  interpretations thus may  be  incorrect. 
Testing for the significance of this hypothesis is  extremely difficult 
because  of simultaneity problems.  However,  for the Engel  and  Frankel  sample 
period (October 1979  to  August  1981 1,  the correl  ation coefficient between  the 
money  stock  surprise and U.S.  intervention on  the following day  is  -0.106, 
relatively small.  The  negative sign implies that following a positive money 
stock surprise,  the United States sold dollars,  which would moderate  the 
dollar appreciation.  This is  consistent with the notion that central banks 
"lean against the wind" in  their intervention pol  icy,  and it  makes  the Engel 
and  Frankel  findings mot-e  credible.  The  United States has  practically ceased 
intervention in  the foreign exchange markets  under  the Reagan  administration. 
However,  the West  German  and other European monetary  authorities have 
continued intervening regularly,  which still raises some  questions about the 
interpretation of results from the spot reaction of the spot exchange  rate to 
money  stock announcements. 
Finally,  researchers have  ignored the information contained in  the changes 
of the forward exchange  rate.  The  advantages  of  examining  the reaction of 
forward exchange  rates are twofold:  changes  in  the forward exchange  rates 
following a money  stock  surprise are free of the influence of intervention, 
and  the examination of the simultaneous  reaction of the spot and  forward 
exchange  rates provides useful  information as  to the nature and persistence of 
a shock. 
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The  empirical  studies cited above  do  not  distinguish clearly between  the 
different policy  regimes and  the various operating  procedures  that may  be  used 
to achieve  the different policies.  In  theory,  there is little -  a priori  reason 
to make  the distinction.  If  a regime  were  defined  in terms  of  a pol icy 
objective function and  a structural model,  then any  change  in the objective 
function  or  in the structure,  including a change  in the short-run  pol icy 
reaction function,  would  lead  to a change  in  the reduced-form equations for 
asset prices.  In  practice,  changes  in very  short-run operating procedures  may 
have  little effect on  asset prices if the objective function  and  other 
structural  parameters  remain  fixed.  Many  different operating procedures could 
be  used  to achieve  the same  objectives; or, one  operating procedure  could  be 
used  to achieve  very  different objectives.  Our hypothesis is that the Federal 
Reserve  emphasized  non-price objectives before  October 1979.  During  thi  s 
period  the Federal  Reserve  used  an  interest-rate targeting procedure  to 
achieve the monetary  targets.  After October 1979  the Federal  Reserve  put more 
emphasis  on  ending  inflation and  adopted  a policy  that led to decelerating 
inflation.  At the same  time  the Federal  Reserve  switched  to a nonborrowed 
reserve operating procedure  in  which  it  tried to control  the money  supply  by 
controlling nonborrowed  reserves directly and  by  applying administrative 
pressure at the discount window. 
The  nonborrowed  reserve procedure  was  officially abandoned  in  October 
1982.  Since  that time,  the Federal  Reserve  has  used  a borrowed  reserve 
targeting procedure.  It  is shown  below  that a borrowed  reserve procedure  may 
be  described as an  interest-rate smoothing  procedure.  However,  the return  to 
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an  interest-rate smoothing  procedure  does  not  necessarily mean  that the 
Federal  Reserve  has  returned  to an  i nfl ati  onary  pol icy  regime. 
The  Pol icy Regime 
The  pol icy regime,  defined  in this study  by  the objectives of  policy, 
should  have  an  important effect on  the pattern of  responses  by  asset prices to 
a  surprise in the money  stock  announcement.  In  the pre-October 1979  period, 
the surprises in the money  stock  mainly  reflected money  demand  shocks  that on 
average  carried M1  to or above  the upper  limit of  the target range.  Instead 
of  offsetting these deviations from  the monetary  target,  the Federal  Reserve 
a1 lowed  the monetary  targets to drift upward.  This  pol icy  1  ed  the market  to 
be1 ieve  that a  positive money  stock  surprise would  lead to a  shift in the 
money  supply  function,  regardless of  the origin of  the shock.  A  positive 
money  stock  surprise was  an  indication  of  future inflation; one  expected 
interest rates to rise and  the dollar to depreciate  in response  to a  higher 
inflation premium. 
In  the post-October 1979  period,  the Federal  Reserve  announced  that it  was 
placing more  emphasis  on  ending  inflation.  The  Federal  Reserve  a1 so switched 
operating  procedures.  The  nonborrowed  reserve procedure allowed  the Federal 
Reserve  a method  of  inducing  large interest-rate changes  in response to 
deviations of  money  from  target.  Under  this procedure,  the Federal  Reserve 
was  able to reverse deviations of  M1  from  the target path  more  quickly.  Thus, 
the change  in procedures  lent credi bil i ty to the Federal  Reserve's 
announcement  that it  had  switched  to a  policy of  disinflation. 
After 1980,  the  actual  inflation rate began  to fall more  quickly  than 
expected.  Inflation expectations were  lowered,  and  there was  a  large increase 
in  the demand  for money.  In  the classical  model ,-  a one-time  1  owering of  the 
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compensating  increase in  the nominal  money  supply--to clear the market for 
real balances.  In this period there was  a rapid decline of inflation below 
the rate that was  thought to be  consistent with the Federal  Reserve's monetary 
targets,  and  there was  a large positive drift  in  MI above  the targets in  both 
1982 and 1983. 
This one-time shift in  the demand  for real balances described above  is  a 
temporary  phenomenon.  Mundel 1 (1  963  and Tobin  (1  965)  argue  that a reduction 
in  the equilibrium inflation rate can a1  so  raise the trend in  the growth  rate 
of money  demand;  this results from a wealth effect.6  At  a lower expected 
inflation rate,  the higher demand  for the real balances  will lead to a 
leftward shift in  the demand  for real savings and  to an  increase in  the .real 
interest rate. 
During this period there was  another  important factor that should have  led 
to an  increase in  the demand  for  money--the end  of the prohibition against 
explicit interest-rate payments  on  checkable  deposits in  January 1981.  This 
change  also was  expected  to have  both temporary  and permanent  effects on  the 
growth  of the demand  for MI.  When  depository institutions were  allowed to  pay 
interest on  checkable  accounts,  there should have  been  a one-time  shift of 
funds  out of passbook  savings and  other sources  of wealth into MI.  This large 
transitory shift of funds was  expected to  be  followed by a permanent  increase 
in  the growth  rate of the demand  for MI,  resulting from the permanent 
reducti  on  in  the opportunity cost of holding checkable deposits. 7 
In sum,  these changes  could have  been  expected to increase the demand  for 
real balances.  As  long as  the Federal  Reserve was  expected  to  maintain its 
disinflation objective,  it  was  not expected to accommodate  fully future 
increases in  money  demand.  Therefore,  a positive money  stock  surprise was 
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real interest rate.  If  this hypothesis  is  correct,  then in  the post-1979 
period we  expect an  increase in  both short-  and long-term interest rates and a 
significant appreciation in  both spot and  forward exchanges  following a 
surprise increase in  the money  stock. 
The  Operating Procedure 
Monetary  pol  icy actions i  nfl  uence market  variables directly through thei  r 
effect on  the reserve market and  indirectly through their effect on 
expectations.  We  have  examined  the indirect effect.  This subsection 
describes the direct effect by analyzing a typical bank's use of information 
in  the money  stock announcement  under  alternative reserve accounting rules and 
operating procedures.  Between  September  1968  and February 1984,  banks  were 
required to hold reserves  against deposits on  a 1  agged basis; i  .  e.,  average 
daily reserves held in  any  given week  were  used to  meet  reserve requirements 
calculated from deposit levels of two  weeks  earlier.  This 1  ag was  instituted 
in  1968  to give individual banks  precise knowledge  about the level of their 
reserve requirement.  The  lag also gave  the Federal  Reserve  time to collect 
information about aggregate  reserve demand. 
In  February  1984,  the Federal Reserve  implemented  a return to almost 
contemporaneous  reserve accounting.  The  banking system had objected to this 
switch on  the grounds  that it  would be  costly to set up  the information 
systems  necessary  to  monitor deposit levels on  an  instantaneous basis.  As  a 
concession to this issue,  the Federal  Reserve chose  a form of  CRR  that was  not 
truly contemporaneous;  instead,  the lag was  reduced  from fourteen days  to two 
days. 
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reserve accounting period from  one  week  to two weeks.  Banks  now  post reserves 
averaged over two  weeks  ending on  a Wednesday,  against deposits averaged  over 
two  weeks  ending on  a Monday.  Banks  have  two  days  to  measure  transactions 
deposits and adjust their reserve positions accordingly.  Only  reserve 
requirements  against transactions deposits are contemporaneous. 
There  was  also a  change  in  the timing of the weekly money  stock 
announcement.  The  announcement  was  moved  up one  day  to  Thursday,  4:30 prn 
EST.  Even  though  the Federal  Reserve  required banks  to speed up  the 
collection and  reporting of deposit data,  the actual  data released on  Thursday 
are "older" than data that had been  released on  Friday.  Under  the lagged 
reserve accounting rules,  the weekly money  stock data  re1  eased  on  Friday 
referred to the average  daily level of M1  for the week  ending on  Wednesday, 
nine days  earlier.  Under  the new  arrangement,  the data released on  Thursday 
refer to the average  daily level of M1  for the week  ending Monday,  ten days 
earl i  er. 
On  the last day  (Wednesday)  of the weekly  settlement period,  all banks 
have  to  meet  their reserve requirements.  This is  an  unusual  market;  we  can 
think of no  other where  all fir-rns are required to adjust inventories to 
pre-specified levels at the same  time.  Early in  the reserve accounting 
period,  before the money  supply announcernent,  each  bank  coul  d calculate its 
own  reserve requirement,  but it  did not know  aggregate  reserve demand.  Under 
lagged reserve accounting rules,  the announcement  of MI was  made  nine days 
after the end  of the deposit computation period,  but five days before the end 
of the reserve maintenance  period.  Consequently,  the money  stock announcement 
contained information about the aggregate demand  for reserves in  the 
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accounting rules,  the announcement  of M1  is  always made  after the reserve 
market clears. 
To  explain the reaction of the federal  funds  rate to the money  stock 
announcement,  we  will look at three factors:  the reserve accounting rules,  the 
nonborrowed  reserve operating procedures,  and  the timing of the release of 
information about the money  stock.  Under  the federal  funds rate targeting 
procedure  and  lagged reserve accounting,  the market had  quite good  information 
about the reserve supply  function.  The  Federal  Open  Market  Committee  (FOMC) 
set narrow 1  imi  ts within which the federal  funds rate was  allowed to 
fluctuate.  The  manager  of the open  market desk  at  the Federal  Reserve Bank  of 
Mew  York  (hereafter referred to as  the desk)  would enter the market to sell 
securities if  the federal  funds  rate fell below  the lower  1  imi  t; he  would 
enter the market to buy  securities whenever  the federal  funds rate traded 
above  the upper  limit.  This intervention throughout  the trading day  sent an 
immediate  signal  to the market about the limits on  the operating target.  The 
FOMC  directed the desk  to set a narrow range  for the federal  funds  rate,  but 
the range was  conditioned on  objectives of the FOMC,  usually on  the growth of 
the monetary  aggregates  relative to short-run paths that were  set at the FOMC 
meetings.  However,  changes  in  the limits for the federal  funds  rate range 
were  small  and  infrequent.  As  a result of this procedure,  the market not 
only knew  the current target,  but also it  could forecast short-term interest 
rates several  weeks  in  advance  with small  errors.  The  weekly money  stock 
announcement  was  important in  predicting the reserve supply  function only in 
so  far as  the federal  funds  rate limits were  expected to be  changed  in 
response  to a deviation of the money  stock  from the desired path. 
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function  R;  represents the end-of-period position of  the reserve supply 
curve expected  by  market  participants before the money  supply  announcement. 
d  Likewise,  R  represents the reserve demand  function  before  the money  B 
stock  announcement.  The  reserve supply  function is infinitely elastic 
reflecting the fact that the Federal  Reserve  accommodated  short-run changes  in 
the demand  for reserves.  The  reserve  demand  curve  is  inelastic because of 
1  agged  reserve  requirements.  The  actual  federal  funds  rate target before  the 
announcement  is FF*.  It  is also the  rate that is expected  to prevail  through 
the end  of  the reserve maintenance  period. 
Suppose  there is a  large unexpected  increase  in b41  that shifts the 
expected end-of-period  reserve demand  curve  to the  right.  Early  in the next 
trading day,  the market would  learn whether  this increase were enough  to 
induce  the desk  to shift the reserve supply curve.  If  the desk  intervened  to 
prevent a  rise in interest rates,  the quantity of  reserves supplied would  rise 
to accommodate  the increase in demand.  Because  the  public expected  the 
Federal  Reserve  to accommodate  unexpected  shifts in money  demand,  the federal 
funds  rate would  be  unchanged.  However,  we  might expect  longer-term  interest 
rates to rise if the market  participants expected  this increase  in supply  to 
lead  to inflation,  or if they  expected  the Federal  Reserve  to raise the 
interest-rate operating range  in future weeks.  During  this period  the 
importance  of  the money  stock  announcement  was  limited by  the 
information-transmitting aspects of  the interest-rate operating procedure. 
When  the  FOMC  announced  a change  in operating targets on  October  6, 1979, 
there was  a dramatic change  in the information  flow  to the market  about  the 
relative position of  the  reserve  supply  function.  Following  an  FOMC  meeting, 
the Federal  Reserve  staff of  economists  constructed  paths  for nonborrowed 
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Panel  c:  Borroved Reserves  Target 
F isure  1 
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assumption.  The  procedure was  to maintain  the path  for nonborrowed  reserves 
and  allow  unexpected  changes  in total  reserve demand  to feed  into the discount 
window.  The  nonborrowed  reserve path  was  adjusted automatically  in response 
to unexpected  changes  in the multiplier.  Sometimes,  though  not often,  the 
nonborrowed  reserve path  was  adjusted  judgmentally  for policy  reasons,  such  as 
the behavior of  the  broader  aggregates or some  other economic  variable. 8 
The  reserve supply  function  is  shown  in panel  b  of  figure 1.  Market 
participants estimated expected  nonborrowed  reserve targets  (NBR*)  using 
information about  the annual  monetary  targets, minutes  from  past FOFIC 
meetings,  and  recent information  about  MI.  Neither market  participants nor 
the Federal  Reserve  had  accurate  information  about  the demand  for borrowed 
reserves.  Federal  Reserve  administrative guidelines discouraged  banks  from 
borrowing  at the discount window.  Therefore,  it  took  a greater spread  between 
the federal  funds  rate and  the discount  rate to induce more  banks  to borrow  at 
the window.  An  unexpectedly  1  arge  increase  in the money  stock  induced  a 
corresponding  shift in the expected  reserve demand  curve.  Expectations about 
the cost of  federal  funds  adjusted  to reflect new  information  about  the 
aggregate demand  for reserves.  In  panel  b  of  figure 1, it is clear that a 
d  d  surprise increase  in the demand  for reserves,  from  RB  to RA,  caused 
the federal  funds  rate to rise from  FFB to FFA. 
An  important  aspect of  the nonborrowed  reserve operating target is the 
automaticity  in the  response of  interest rates to a deviation of  MI  from  the 
short-run  path.  Under  this procedure,  deviations of  the other aggregates are 
automati  cal ly accommodated  by  the weekly  mu1 ti  pl ier adjustments  to the 
nonborrowed  reserve  path. 
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automatically to deviations of  Ill  from  path.  This  decision was  based  on  the 
uncertainty surrounding financial  innovations,  changing  regulations,  and  the 
unusual  behavior  of  MI  velocity.  In  October 1982,  the FOMC  adopted  a 
procedure based  on  a target for borrowed  reserves and  an  assumption 
(prediction) about excess  reserves.  Under  LRR,  the Federal  Reserve  had 
relatively accurate information  about  reserve demand.  The  desk  set 
nonborrowed  reserve targets each  week  based  on  a forecast of  reserve demand 
and  the  borrowing  target chosen  by  the  FOMC.  Each  week,  the desk  adjusted the 
nonborrowed  reserve path  (NBR)  to accommodate  the shift in reserve demand. 
The  procedure  is portrayed  in panel  c of  figure 1.  The  announcement  of  an 
unexpectedly  large increase  in  M1  was  accompanied  by  a compensating  shift in 
NBR  so  that the borrowing  target was  maintained.  On  a weekly  average  basis 
this procedure  1  ooked  much  1  i  ke  the i  nterest-rate operating procedure that was 
in effect before October  1979.  One  difference was  that any  rotation of  the 
borrowing  demand  curve led to a different federal  funds  rate. 
During  the nonborrowed  reserve  procedure,  the Federal  Reserve  entered the 
market once  a day,  usually between  11:30  am  and  noon.  The  operation  was 
primarily defensive;  i.e.,  it  was  a response  to movements  in the 
uncontroll  able sources of  reserve supply.  To  a 1  arge extent,  that intra-week 
procedure was  continued  with the  borrowing  target.  The  market  participants 
did not  know  the exact amount  of  the borrowing  target, nor  did they  know  the 
exact 1  ocation of  the borrowing  function.  Consequently,  they could  not narrow 
down  a small  range  for the funds  rate as they  had  done  prior to October 1979. 
The  weekly  averages  were  very  stable,  but daily volatility made  it more 
difficult for the market  to perceive changes  in the stance of  policy than  had 
been  the case when  the federal  funds  rate was  the operating  target. 
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federal  funds rate smoothing procedure.  Because  of lagged reserve 
requirements,  the money  stock  announcement  still contained information about 
the aggregate  demand  for reserves.  However,  because  of borrowed reserve 
targeting,  market participants expected the Federal  Reserve  to accommodate  an 
unanticipated shift in  the demand  for reserves by adjusting nonborrowed 
reserves.  Therefore,  one  would expect no  significant reaction of the federal 
funds rate to  money  stock announcements. 
Finally,  the recent change  in  the reserve  settlement rules has  important 
implications for the effect of  money  stock announcements  on  the federal  funds 
rate.  Before February  2,  1984,  the deviation of  the money  stock announcement 
from  the expected level gave  the market two  types of information:  the first 
was  information  about  the aggregate  quantity of reserves that would be 
demanded  over  the next few  trading days;  the second  was  information about  the 
position of the money  stock  relative to the perceived policy target.  Under 
the hypothesis  that prices in  efficient  markets  aggregate information,  the 
money  stock announcements  no  longer include new  information about aggregate 
reserve demand.  That  information will already  be  apparent from the interest 
rates that prevailed during the reserve settlement period that will have  ended 
before  the money  stock  dats are released.  The  market will also have  better 
information about  the money  stock relative to the perceived pol  icy target.  To 
some  extent it  will be  inferred from the information in  aggregate reserves. 
Furthermore,  banks  installed new  infomation-gathering systems  to  meet  reserve 
requirements  on  a contemporaneous  basis.  Many  arrangements  have  been made  by 
banks  and  private firms to pool  deposit information in  a way  that mimics  the 
process of deposit data collection used by  the Federal  Reserve.  These  factors 
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the money  stock announcements  and  subsequent changes  in  asset prices. 
IV.  Empirical  Resul ts 
The  empirical results presented  in  this section are based on  estimates of 
the parameters  of equation 1,  shown  in  the introduction.  The  assets included 
in  this study are the federal  funds  rate,  a trade-weighted daily average;  the 
coupon-equivalent yield on  three- and  twelve-month  Treasury bills; and  the 
constant maturity yiel  d on  three-year,  seven-year,  and  thirty-year Treasury 
bonds.''  (See  appendix  A  for a detailed description of the data. )  The 
money  stock announcement  was  made  at  4:15  or 4:30  pm  EST.  Estimates of al 
and  a*  for domestic  interest rates are reported in  the top of tables 2 and  3. 
We  have  followed the suggestion  of Shiller,  Campbell,  and Schoenholtz  by 
including the forward interest rates implied by the expectations theory of the 
term structure.  We  use  Shil  ler's (1979)  duration-adjusted 1  inear 
approximation to construct the implied forward rates.  Estimates of al  and 
a*  for the implied forward rates are shown  in  the middle of tables 2  and  3. 
In  addition,  we  examine  the reactions of the dollar/mark  spot rate,  the 
three-month dollar/mark  forward rate,  and  the twelve-month  dollar/mark  forward 
rate to  money  stock  announcements.  These  results are shown  in  the bottom of 
tables 2 and 3. 
The  full sample  period starts on  September  28,  1977,  and ends  on  September 
21,  1984.  We  assume  that there was  a switch from a policy that led to 
accelerating inflation before October 1979  to  a  pol  icy that emphasized 
disinflation after October 1979.  The  estimation period incl  udes  three 
different operating procedures:  a federal  funds rate operating procedure  from 
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Table  2  Impact of  Money  Stock  Surprises on  Asset Prices  (al) 
Operating  target 
LRR  CRR 
Non- 
Federal  borrowed  Borrowed  Borrowed 
Dependent  variable  funds  reserves  reserves  reserves 
Federal  funds  rate  0.01 8  0. 378a  0.098  0.043~ 
(0.87)  (4.04)  (1.50)  (0.34) 
3-month  Treasury  0.072  0.364  0.1 90  0.01 9 
(3.11  (6.58)  (5.77)  (0.45) 
1  2-month  Treasury  0.072  0.338  0.21 6  0.020 
(4.73)  (7.59)  (5.62)  (0.32) 
a 
3-year  govt.  bond  0.041  0.263  0.185  -0.001 
(4.63)  (7.43)  (5.11)  (-0.02) 
7-year  govt.  bond  0.027  0.1 88  0.1 85  -0.002 
(3.42)  (6.60)  (5.94)  (-0.03) 
30-year govt.  bond  0.01 6  0.115  0.1 50  -0.01 6 
(2.95)  (4.48)  (4.86)  ( -0.27) 
9-month  forward  rate  0.072  0.329  0.225  0.020 
3-mon th a  head  (4.80)  (7.35)  (5.43)  (0.27) 
2-year  forward  rate  0.01 8  0.21 9  0.1 67  -0.01 4 
1  -year ahead  (1.69)  (6.48)  (4.41 )  (-0.19) 
4-year  forward  rate  0.01 6  0.101  0.185  -0.003 
3-years ahead  (1.49)  (3.90)  (5.86)  ( -0.04) 
23-year  forward  rate  0.007  0.01 3  0.1 08  -0.036 
7-year  ahead  (0.97)  (0.65)  (3.01 )  (-0.59) 
Do1 1  ar/mark  spot  0.1 05  -0.438  -0.607  0.117 
exchange  rate  (1.08)  (-3.82)  (-3.19)  (0.30) 
Do1 1  ar/mark  3-month  0.134  -0.343  -0.556  0.131 
forward exchange  rate  (1.35)  (-3.12)  (-2.95)  (0.33) 
Do1 1  ar/mark  1  2-month  0.369  -0.221  -0.476  0.1 82 
forward exchange  rate  (2.44)  (-2.08)  (-2.61 )  (0.45) 
a  Indicates significant fi  rst-order autocorrel ation.  These  parameters were 
estimated using a  Cochrane-Orcutt procedure.  The  t-statistics are shown  in 
parentheses. 
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Table 3  Impact  of  Expected  Money  Stock  Changes  on  Asset Prices  (a2) 
Operating  target 
LRR  CRR 
Non- 
Federal  borrowed  Borrowed  Borrowed 
Dependent  vari  abl e  funds  reserves  reserves  reserves 
a  a 
Federal  funds  rate  -0.021  -0.167  -0.033  -0.324 
(-0.81 )  (-1.03)  (-0.47)  (-2.36) 
3-month  Treasury  -0.045  -0.31 0  -0.050  -0.085 
(-1.61 )  (-3.28)  (-1 -41  )  (-1.85) 
1 ?-month  Treasury  -0.037  -0.231  -0.079  -0.094 
(2.03)  (-3.03)  (-1.90)  (-1.34) 
a 
3-year govt.  bond  -0.030  -0.140  -0.083  -0.069 
(2.95)  (-2.30)  (-2.12)  (-0.94) 
7-year govt.  bond  -0.015  -0.136  -0.093  -0.068 
(-1.58)  (-2.81)  (-2.76)  (-.92) 
30-year govt.  bond  -0.01 3  -0.167  -0.067  -0.100 
(-1.90)  (-3.79)  (-2.00)  (-1.49) 
9-month  forward  rate  -0.035  -0.204  -0.089  -0.097 
3-month  ahead  -1.91  (-2.66)  (-1.98)  (-1 .I61 
2-year  forward  rate  -0.01 9  -0.085  -0.085  -0.084 
1  -year ahead  (-1.47)  (-1.47)  (-2.08)  (-0.66) 
4-year  forward  rate  -0.009  -0.133  -0.105  -0.066 
3-years ahead  (-0.66)  (-2.98)  (-3.06)  (-0.80) 
23-year forward  rate  -0.01 1  -0.207  -0.035  -0.146 
7-years ahead  (-1.29)  (-4.19)  (-0.90)  (-2.12) 
Do1  1  ar/mark  spot  -0.068  0.522  -0.606  0.01 0 
exchange  rate  (-0.58)  (2.66)  (-3.19)  (0.02) 
Do1 1  ar/mark  3-month  -0.05  0.462  -0.102  0.01 1 
forward exchange  rate  (-0.42)  (2.45)  (0.79)  (0.03) 
Do1 1  ar/mark  12-month  -0.075  0.429  0.1 53  0.047 
forward  exchange  rate  (-0.41 )  (2.36)  (0.77)  (0.11 
--- 
a.  See  fn a, table 2. 
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reserve operating procedure  from  October  6,  1979,  until  October 5,  1982;  and 
the current borrowed  reserve operating procedure  that was  adopted  in  October 
1982.  There  are two  reserve accounting  regimes:  lagged  reserve  requirements 
before February  2,  1984,  and  contemporaneous  reserve  requirements afterward. 
September 1977  to October 1979 
The  results from  the pre-October 1979  period  provide support for the 
hypothesis  that the money  stock announcement  during this period contained 
information  about future inflation.  The  estimate of  al  was  positive and 
significant at a 5 percent critical level  for all of  the domestic  interest 
rates except the federal  funds  rate.  The  lack  of  response of  the federal 
funds  rate was  expected.  The  market  anticipated that the Federal  Reserve 
would  accommodate  the  unexpected  shifts in the demand  for reserves; 
consequently,  the cost of  obtaining reserves the remaining  days  of  the 
settlement week  was  expected  to remain  relatively  unchanged.  All  of  the 
imp1 ied forward  rates responded  positively to the money  stock  surprises,  but 
only  in the case of  the  three-month  ahead,  nine-month  rate was  the response 
significantly different from  zero at the 5 percent level. 
By  themselves  the  interest-rate results are consistent with  almost any  of 
the alternative hypotheses.  Following  the suggestion of  Engel  and  Frankel,  we 
look  at the reaction  in the spot dollar/mark  exchange  market.  A1 though  the 
do1 1  ar depreciated  foll  owing  a  positive money  stock  surprise,  the response in 
the spot market  was  not statistically significant.  The  dollar also 
depreciated in the three- and  twelve-month  forward  exchange markets  following 
a  positive surprise  in the money  stocl:  announcement.  The  response of  the 
twelve-month  forward  exchange  rate is statistically significant at the 5 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copypercent level.  These  findings provide  support for the inflation premium 
hypothesis over  the  policy anticipation  hypothesis  and  for our assumption  that 
the pre-October 1979  period can  be  characterized as an  inflationary monetary 
pol icy  regime. 
October 1979  to October 1982 
During  the period of  the  nonborrowed  reserve operating procedure,  the 
reactions of  all domestic  interest rates were  much  greater than  before.  In 
the earlier period,  a 1 percent  positive surprise in the money  stock  led to a 
7-basis-point  increase  in the  three-month  Treasury  bill rate and  a  1.5- 
basis-point increase  in the thirty-year Treasury  bond  rate.  In  the period of 
nonborrowed  reserve targeting,  the  reactions of  these rates were  considerably 
stronger,  36 and  11.5  basis points,  respectively.  Furthermore,  the  response 
of  the  federal  funds  rate to money  stock  surprises was  stronger and 
statistically significant at the 5  percent level.  Participants  in the  reserve 
market  understood  that a positive surprise  in the aggregate  demand  for 
reserves within the settlement week  would  lead to a higher cost of  borrowing 
reserves for the remainder  of  the settlement week. 
There  was  also a dramatic  change  in  the  response  in exchange  markets.  The 
spot and  forward  dollar exchange  rates appreciated sharply against the mark 
following a positive money  stock  announcement.  This  was  a sharp  reversal  from 
the earlier period.  Engel  and  Frankel  attributed this reversal  in the spot 
market  to a change  in the  real  interest rate caused  by  expected  liquidity 
effects.  This  explanation  is inconsistent with  the significant reaction of 
the forward  interest rates several  years out and  the  twelve-month  ahead 
forward  exchange  rates.  Furthermore,  it  does  not explain  the significant 
depreciation of  the forward  exchange  rate in the earlier period. 
http://clevelandfed.org/research/workpaper/index.cfm
Best available copyMe  attribute the appreciation  of  the dollar and  the strong upward  reaction 
of  interest rates subsequent  to a positive money  stock  surprise during  this 
period  to the policy  regime  change.  Money  stock  announcements  provided  the 
market  with  information  about  persistent money  demand  shocks  that the Federal 
Reserve  was  not expected  to acco~mnodate  fully.  Following a positive money 
stock  surprise,  the market  revised upward  its assessment of  current and  future 
real  interest rates,  leading to an  appreciation of  the spot and  forward  values 
of  the do1 lar. 
October 1982  to February 1984 
The  next  period is interesting,  because it  allows  us  to test whether  the 
change  in the operating  procedure  can  be  viewed  as a change  in the policy 
regime.  After October 1982,  the Federal  Reserve  began  to target borrowed 
reserves.  Since this is  an  interest-rate smoothing  procedure,  the federal 
funds  rate was  not expected  to respond  to the announcements.  The  response  of 
the federal  funds  rate during  this period was  statistically insignificant. 
The  pattern of  responses  of  interest rates and  exchange  rates is  similar 
to the one  ohserved  in the period of  nonborrowed  reserve targeting.  The 
longest-term interest rates and  the forward  exchange  rates react more  strongly 
in this period  than  they  did during  the nonborrowed  reserve operating 
procedure.  This suggests  to us  that the strong response of  asset prices, 
other than  the federal  funds  rate,  resulted from  disinflation policy and  not 
from  the change  in operating  procedures.  The  dramatic  difference between  the 
pattern of  responses  under  borrowed  reserve  targeting procedures and  under  the 
interest-rate targeting procedures suggests  that the operating  procedure  did 
not determine  the policy  regime  for this sample  period. 
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As  predicted,  the money  supply announcements  appear  to be  irrelevant. 
Estimates of al  are not statistically significant for any  of the assets we 
examined.  This "surprise
1'  we  measure  includes information that has  been 
revealed in  the clearing of the reserve market before tile rrioney  stock  is 
announced.  Furthermore,  each  individual partici  pant now  hri  ngs  better  ( 1  ocal ) 
information to the reserve market clearing.  Under  CRR,  banks  have  had  to 
upgrade  their own  deposi  t-moni tori  ng systems.  Banks  and i  nformation-service 
companies  such  as Money  Market Services have  developed more  scientific 
information-pooling systems  to replicate the Federal  Reserve's  procedure for 
constructing the fi  rst-pub1 i  shed  MI data. 
The  Rationality of the Survey  Forecasts 
The  estimates of ap  are shown  in  table 3.  According to the efficient 
market hypothesis,  this coefficient should be  zero.  However,  we  find that the 
coefficient  is  significantly less than zero in  many  cases  across all regimes. 
We  suggest that the negative sign results because  the survey  is  an  inefficient 
forecast of the expected change  in  F11.  The  agents  participati'ng  in  the survey 
are only a subset  of those  participating in  the market.  The  median  survey  of 
their opinions is  less efficient than  the market opinion embedded  in  the 
interest rate just prior to the announcement.  This market 
opinion is  a trade-weighted opinion of all the participants in  the market. 
Since this interest rate enters the dependent  variable with a negative sign, 
we  get a negative sign for a*. 
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Our main  objective  in this paper is to explain  the changing  patterns of 
response by  asset prices to money  stock  announcements during several 
subperiods between  1977  and  the present.  Previous work  in  this area  has  not 
distinguished between  policy  regimes and  operating procedures.  Furthermore, 
we  can  now  include evidence  from  a new  operating procedure and  new  reserve 
accounting  rules.  We  also include information  from  the forward  exchange 
market.  By  taking account  of  forward  exchange  rates and  the institutional, 
procedural,  and  policy changes,  we  are able to resolve ambiguities that remain 
in published work. 
First, we  show  that the  pattern of  response of  the federal  funds  rate to 
money  stock  surprises during different subperiods over  the last seven years 
depends  on  the Federal  Reserve's  operating  procedure  and  the reserve 
accounting rules.  Second,  we  show  that a change  in the operating  procedure 
does  not necessarily imply  a change  in the monetary  policy  regime.  In  this 
context,  we  show  that the positive response  of  asset prices to money  stock 
surprises in the pre-October 1979  period  resulted  from  an  inflation premium. 
In  contrast, the response of  asset prices to money  stock  surprises in the 
post-October 1979  period  resulted  from  a change  in the expected  real  interest 
rate. 
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MI  - 
M1  is  the figure first  published by the Federal Reserve  in  the H.6  press 
release.  The  expected change  in  MI is  calculated using the median  of a survey 
taken by Money  Market  Services.  The  expected changes  (MMSP)  are in  bill  ions 
of  dollars.  The  expected change  in  MI (EM  in  the text) is  calculated as: 
EMt  =  log (M1t-l  +  MMSPt)  -  log (Mlt-l), 
where t refers to the week  of the announcement  rather than the statement  week 
for which MI was  calculated.  The  surprise in  MI  (UM  in  the text) is 
calculated as: 
UMt  =  1  og  (MI t)  -  109  (MI t-l  + I*IMSPt). 
We  have  used  first-published numbers  rather than revised numbers  in  making 
these calculations.  This amounts  to treating the revision as  an  unexpected 
change.  Roley  (1  982)  shows  resul  ts that are invariant to the use  of 
first-pub1 i  shed or revised data.  He  concludes  that the revisions should not 
be  treated as  unexpected  changes  in  MI.  However,  he  excluded the October  to 
December  1979 period.  Mhen  this period is  included,  we  find that the 
revisions have  the same  effect on  asset prices as  the unexpected changes  in  MI. 
We  used  the MI series that was  published in  the H.6  release.  When  the 
definition of MI changed,  our measure  changed.  Overlapping data were  used  to 
splice the series in  early 1980  when  the Federal  Reserve changed  the 
definition of M1  to include other checkable  deposits. 
Interest Rates  and  Exchange  Rates 
The  interest rates and  exchange  rates come  from the data banks  of Data 
Resources  Inc.  The  original source  for the interest rates is  the H.15 
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Since the H.6  release  (Money  Announcement) was  made  on  various days  throughout 
the sample  period,  we  collected daily data.  A  "before-announcement
n  rate was 
taken as the last available value  before the announcement.  The 
''after-announcement
1'  rate was  taken  as the  first available value after the 
announcement.  There  is always at least a 24-hour  span  between  the "before" 
and  "after" quote.  The  major  effect of  this procedure  is to reduce  the  R 2 
in the estimate of  equation 1  in the text.  There  is no  reason  why  the 
parameters  of  equation 1 should  be  biased  unless there are other factors that 
are correlated with the surprise in the money  stock  announcement.  Details for 
each  of  the asset prices are listed below: 
Federal  funds  rate.  The  effective federal  funds  rate is a trade-weighted 
average  for the day. 
Treasury  bills.  The  three- and  twelve-month Treasury  bill yields are 
based  on  the bid quotes at the close of  the New  York  market  (4:00  pm  EST). 
Treasury  coupons.  The  three-,  seven-,  and  thirty-year yields are based  on 
the bid quotes at the close of  the New  York  market.  We  have  used yields 
calculated at "constant maturity"  from  the Treasury's daily yield curve. 
Implied  forward  rates.  These  rates are calculated using  the following 
formula  from  Shil ler, Campbell,  and  Schoenhol tz (1  983) : 
where 
fknym)  =  1  inearized approximation  to the  n  period ahead  m  period 
forward  rate, 
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=  duration of  bonds  maturing  in  m+n  periods. 
Di  is calculated from  the following  formula: 
i  Di  =  (1-g  )/(I-g); o < i, 
where 
g =  1  /(l+E), and 
- 
R  =  mean  R  for each  sub-sample  period  between September  1977  and 
September 1384. 
Of  course,  the f  3/4) forward  rate is  calculated directly from  the 
formula  for the implied  forward  rate as there are no  coupons  on  Treasury 
bill  s.  The  values  for  and  Di  are given  in Table  Al. 
Table  A1  Assumed  values  for  and  Di 
- 
Maturity  R  Di 
Sept 1977  - Oct  1979  3 year 
7 year 
30  year 
Oct  1979  - Oct  1982  3 year 
7 year 
30  year 
Oct1982-Feb1984  3year 
7 year 
30  year 
Feb  1984  - Sept 1984  3 year 
7 year 
30  year 
Do1  1  ar/mark  exchange  rates.  The  foreign currency exchange  rates are 
expressed  as bids  reflecting opening  prices in the New  York  markets. 
Rates  are quotes  in  U.S.  terms  (do1  lars per  deutschemark).  The  dependent 
variable  in  the text is the first difference of  the logarithm. 
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1 . See,  for  example,  Cornel 1  (1  983b),  Engel  and  Frankel  (1  984),  Hardouvel  is 
(1  984),  Loeys  (1  984),  Rol ey  (1  983),  Shi  11  er,  Campbell , and Schoenhol tz 
(1983),  Urich and Wachtel  (1981 1,  and  Urich  (1982). 
2.  Hoehn  (1  984)  presents a  traditional macroeconomic  model  wi  tli  I rational 
expectations and  a highly detailed lnonetary  sector.  He  shows  that the 
reduced-form equations  for the price level,  output,  and  the interest rate 
change  when  the operating procedures change. 
3.  See  Engel  and  Frankel  (1  984). 
4.  Cornel  1  (1  983b)  suggests a ri  sk-premi um  hypothesis.  We  have  not i  ncl  uded 
it  because  he  did not find evidence  to  support it.  Furthermore,  Makin 
(1983)  shows  that the theoretical  effect of policy uncertainty on  asset 
prices is  ambiguous.  In his empirical work  he  finds a  sign opposite to 
that predicted by Cornell. 
5.  See  Brayton,  Farr,  and  Porter  (1983)  for an  econometric  study of this 
issue. 
6.  An  explicit derivation of the relationship between  the real  interest rate 
and  the Mundell-Tobin  wealth effect is  provided in  Makin  (1983). 
7.  See  fn 5. 
8.  See  Stevens  (1  981 )  for a  detailed description of pol  icy during the first 
two years of the nonborrowed reserve targeting procedure. 
9.  Goodfriend  (1983)  uses  a micro-based model  to show  that the borrowing 
relation is  non-linear.  He  shows  that it  is  a  function of past and 
expected future borrowing,  which  depends  on  the expected  future federal 
funds rate. 
10.  See  appendix  A  for a detailed description of data.  The  maturities used in 
this study were  chosen  because  Shil  ler,  Campbell,  and  Shoenhol tz (1  983) 
and Loeys  (1984)  have  found that there tends  to  be  a  similar response 
among  securities with maturities between one  and  three years,  between 
three and  seven years,  and  again with maturities over  seven years. 
11.  While the empirical  evidence presented be1  ow  lends credence  to this 
assumpti  on,  there is  supporting evidence.  Bagshaw  and  Gavin  ( 1984)  show 
that after 1979  the Federal  Reserve  deviated from its  M1  target only 
during periods when  there was  an  offsetting shift in  velocity.  This was  a 
marked change  from the 1976  to  1979 period during which  MI grew  above 
target,  reinforcing the inflationary effects of unexpected  increases in 
vel  oci  ty growth. 
12.  See  Roley  (1983)  for empirical  support of this hypothesis. 
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